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(26 C.2d 705; )(.0 P.2d 78.1]

[L. A. No. 19233. In Bank. June 29, 1945.]

CHARLES S. PELLETT, Appellant, v. SONO'l'ONE COR.
POHA'l'10~ (a Corporation) ct a1., Respondents.
[1] Appeal-Law of Case-Sufficiency of Evidence.-A de('il>ioll by

[2]

[S]

[4]

[5]

)

an appellate court reversing a judglllent of nonsuit thnt the
evidence might support a jud~mellt for plaintiff is binding on
a second appeal from a ,iudgment based on a directed verdict
for defendants, where the evidence is substantially the same
as that introduced at the first trial. Unless it is shown that
some essential fact or facts which were proved at the first trial
were not proved on the second trial, or were conclusively disproved, the .law of the case applies in determining the sufficiency of thf evidence.
Trial-Direction of Verdict.-The power of the trial court to
direct a verdict is subject to the same limitations as its power
to grant a nonsuit.
ReJease-E1fect--Joint Tort FeasofS: Covenant Not to Sue.A. release of one joint tort feasor is a release of all, but a mere
covenant not to sue one joint tort feasor does not release the
others.
Id.-Covenant Not to Sue.-The distinction between a release
and a covenant not to sue is entirely artificial, since in botll
cases there is no further recovery from the defendant who
makes the settlement. The difference in the effect as to third
persons is based mainly on the fact that in one case there is
an immediate release. whereas in the other there is merely
an agreement not to prosecute a suit.
Id.-Agreement as Constituting Release: Oovenant Not to Sue.
-An agreement by plaintiff not to levy execution against one
defendant's property nor make any demand on him to pay

[1] See 2 Oal.Jur. 967; S Am.Jur. 553.
[3] Covenant not to sue one joint tort feasor as a release, notes,
50 A.L.R. 1081 ~ 66 A.L.R. 212; 104 A.L.R. 856; 124 A.L.R. 1309.
See, also, 22 Oal.Jur. 753; 45 Am.Jur. 476.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error, § 1340; [2] Trial,
§ 259; [3] Release, §§ 2, 16(4); (4, 7, 10] Release, 12; [5, P] Release, §§ 1, 2; (8, 8] Release, § L
16 c.zcl-U
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the judgment or any portion thereof in a persolJaJ injury action. in return for which said ddenclant ('ovt'llunted to defend
the action and not to tile the agreement except in th(> event
any proceedings are commenced by plaintiff in violation of
the agreement, is not on its face strictly a release or a covenant
not to sue, although it partakes somewhat of the nature of
both.
[6] Id.-What Constitutes a Release.-A release is the abandonment, relinquishment or ~jving up of a right or claim to the
person against WhOlD it might have been demanded or enforced,
and its efleet is to extinguish the cause of actioll; hence it may
be pleaded as a defens(> to the action.
[7] Id. - Covenant Not to Slie.-A covenant not to sue is not a
present abandonment or relinquishment of a right or claim,
but merely an agreement not to enforce an existing cause of
action. It does not have the effect of extinguishing the cause
of action; and while. in the case of a sole tort feasor. the covenant may be pl{·aded as a bar to the action in order to avoid
circuity of action. a covenant not to sue olle of several joint
tort feasors may not be so pleaded by the covenantee, who
must seek his remedy in action for breach of the covenant.
[8] Id. - Agreement as Constituting Release. - An agreement by.
plaintiff not to levy execution against one defendant's property nor make any demand on him to pay the judJnllent or
any portion thereof in a personal injury action, in return for
which said defendant covenanted to defend the action and not
to tile the agreement except in the event any proceedings are
commenced by plaintiff in violation of the a!n'el:ment, and also
covenanted to make certain payments within a stated time
and an additional sum in the event judgment wa!\ entered for
plaintiff, does not constitute a release since it could not be
pleaded as a defen!\e to the action and there is no provision
of the agreement indicating any relinquishment of the right
of action or that any payment is to be in satisfaction or in
compromisf' thereof.
[9] Id.-Agreement as Constituting Release: Oovenant Not to Sue.
-In the case of covenants not to sue, while it is customary
for the covenantor to make an express agreement to indemnify
the· covenantee and hold him harmless in ease of violation of
the covenants, it is not essential that there be an express
agreement to that effect, and the covenantee may waive the
undertaking to indemnify and rely solely on his remedy f?r
breach of the covenant. Hence, in an agreement by plaintd!
not to levv execution against one defen~ant's property nor
make any demand on him to pay the judgment or any portion
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thereof in a personal inJury action, in return for which said
defendant covenanted to defend the action and not to file
the agreement except in the event any proceedings are commenced by plaintiff in violation of the agreement, the absence
of any provision for indemnification does not compel a holding that the document is a release.
[10] ld.-Covenant Not to Sue.-An agreement by plaintiff not to
levy execution against one defendant's property nor' make, any
demand on him to pay the judgment or any portion thereof
in a personal injury action, in return for which said defendant
covenanted to defend the action and not to file the agreement
except in the event any proceedings are commenced by plaintiff in violation of the agreement, cannot be construed strictly
as a covenant not to sue, since it does not contemplate a cessation of the existing litigation. However, sinee plainti1f did
not relinquish his claim or right of action, and merely agreed
not to levy execution or make demand for payment, the agreement is closely akin to a covenant not to sue, its legal effect
should be held to be similar, and it does not operate to release
other joint tort feasors.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Charles S. Burnell, Judge. Reversed.
Action for damages for negligence in failing to remove from
plaintiff's ear all of the plaster used in making a east thereof.
Judgment on directed verdict for defendants reversed.

)
/

Joseph D. Taylor and Russell G. Hager for Appellant.
Leonard Wilson for Respondents.

)
/

GIBSON, C. J.-This is a second appeal by plaintiff in an
action for damages for personal injuriC$. On the prior appeal (Pellett v. Sonotone Corp., 55 Cal.App.2d 158 [130 P.2d
181]) a judgment of nonsuit was reversed. On the second
trial the court directed a verdict in favor of the defendants.
and plaintiff has appealed from the ensuing judgment.
Plaintiff purchased a hearing device from defendant Sonotone Corporation. Part of the device consisted of an individually moulded ear tip which required the making of a plaster
cast or impl'eflSion of plaintiff's ear. Defendant Brown, a
salesman and "consultant" for defendant Sonotone, requested
defendant Compton, a dentist, to make the east, and plainti1f
and Brown went to Compton's omce for that purpose. Comp-

!

I

708

)
/

"

)

PELLETT V. SONOTONE r,ORP.

r26 C.2d

ton, assisted by Brown, made the cast. Subsequently plaintiff
felt a pain in his ear. He consulted an ear specialist and
learned that a foreign substance was present. Some plaster
of paris, wax, and cotton were removed. and the pain diminished and then disappeared,
[1] Aside from the agreement hereafter referred to. it
appears that the evidence was substantially the same as that
introduced at the first trial which resulted in a nonsuit. On
appeal that judgment was reversed by the District Court of
Appeal which held (55 Cal.App.2d 158. 161 [130 P.2d 181])
that .. Assuming for the purpose of this appeal only that the
above statement of facts if! true,. we are of the opinion that
the trial jury might reasonably have believed that defendant
. Compton and defendant Brown were agent.~ of defendant Sono, tone Corporation and that defendant Compton and defendant
.Brown were negligent in not having used an appropriate instrument to examine plaintiff's ear after the plaster ca.c;t was
made to be certain that none of the plaster or cotton used
remained in his ear, and likewise that plaintiff was not dila,tory in discovering that some of the plaster and cotton had
been negligently left in his ear." No attempt has been made
to show that there was any substantial difference in the evidence at the second trial. but even if additional evidence was
,introduced, any conflict thereby created would be immaterial
in determining the sufficiency of the evidence. to support a
judgment for plaintiff. Unless it is shown that some e.c;sentiaJ
fact or facts which were proved at the first trial were not
proved on the second trial, or were conclusi1Jely disproved.
the law of the case applies in determining the suffi~ency of
the evidence. (Berry v. lIfaywood Mut. W. Co. No. One,
13 Cal.2d 185, 186 [88 P.2d 7051: lVel1.s v. Lloyd, 21 Cal.2d
452, 454, 455 [132 P.2d 471].) [3] The power of the trial
court to direct a verdict is subject to the same limitations as
its power to grant a nommit (Gindraux v. Maurice :Mercantile
Co.,4 Cal.2d 206, 208 [47 P.2d 708): Gish v. Los Angeles Ry.
'Corp., 13 Ca1.2d 570, 572. 573 [90 P.2d 792]), and hence,
under the law of the case, it must be held that plaintiff had
made a sufficient showing and was entitled to have the isSues submitted to the jury unless he had released the defendants from liability,
Defendants claim that the directed verdict was justified
because they were released by reason of plaintiff's execution
of a document reading as follows;

I
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Charle.<; S. Pellett, through his attorney, ha~
become satisfied that the defendant. O. L. Compton, in the performance of any acts 01' of hiR nc~ligcnt failure to do anythinl!
which Rhould have been done; was subject to the direction and
control and supervision of John E. Brown and the Sonotone
Corporation. and that any negligence on the part of said Dr.
G. L. Compton, was not due to any culpahility of the said
G. r~. Compton. and,
"WHEREAS, Charles S·. Pellett is also satisfied that a great
portion of the property of G. L. Compton is exempt from execution and that the levy of an execution upon any property
of G. L. Compton will work a hardship upon him, and
"WHEREAS, in any event. Charles S. Pellett has been advised by his counsel that the covenant hereinafter made will
in no wise prejudice his ease or prevent recovery and collection from the defendant Sonotone Corporation, and the defendant. John R Brown;
.
"Now. THEREFORE, Charles S. Pellett hereby agrees and
covenants with G. L. Compton as follows: .
"Said G. L. Compton. as a consideration for the covenant
hereby made by Charles S. Pellett, does hereby agree to pay
to the said Charle.q S. Pellett the sum of $10.00 in the event
a judgment iR entered in favor of Charles S. Pellett and defendant in said action, and said G. L. Comptom agrees to
pay to said CharIeR S. Penett the sum of $5.00 on or before
60 days from date hereof in any event and regardless of
what judgment may be entered in the above entitled action.
"In consideration of the promiqes herein contained on the
part of G. L. Compton. CharIeR S. Pe)]ett covenants and agreeR
with said G. L. Compton that in the event a judgment is entered against said G. L. Compton, in the above entitled action,
that he will Dot levy execution issued upon said judgment
against any property of said G. L. Compton and that he will
make no demand upon G. J.... Compton to pay said judgment
or any portion thereof.
"Said G. L. Compton, as further consideration for the covenant herein contained agrees not to file this covenant and
agreement in the above entitled action, except in the event
any proceedings are commenced by Charles A.. Pellett eontrary to and in violation of this covenant.
.
"Said G. L. Compton further agrees that he will defend
said action by his attorney in the interests of justice and will
not withdraw his attorney from said action. until & ~ct of
"WHEREAS,
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the jury has been rendered or until the court has by directed verdict or non-suit terminated the trial of said action.
"IN WITNESS WHERROF the parties hereto have signed this
covenant this
day of June, 1941.
Charles S. Pellett
Plaintiff
G; L. Compton,
Said Defendant."

)

)

Defendants contend that this document constituted a release
of defendant Compton and consequently a discharge of the
others. Plaintiff contends that the document was not intended
to· be and is not a release, or even a covenant not to sue, but
merely an agreement not to ·levy execution on defendant
Compton's property and not to make demand on him for
payment of any judgment rendered.
It appears that thL'! document was executed while the first
trial was in progress. and plaintiff's explanation is that "Under ordinary circumstances a dismissal of the case against
G. L. Compton would have been filed, but because of the dot'tor's better knowledge of what had happened in connection
with the making of the plaster impression and the adverse
interest which, under plaintiff's theory of the case, he had in
clearing himself of responsibility by showing that he acted 8.R
directed by Sonotone Corporation, it was considered naces- ,
sary to have his counsel continue throughout the trial, and
for that reason the document in question was prepa:r:ed and
executed." The existence of this document was not disclosed i,
until the case was called for the second trial when defendant
Compton tIOught a continuance because his former attorney
was in miltary service. Plaintiff's counsel opposed a continuance stating that the matter had been settled as to him, but
refused to give a copy of the agreement to counsel for defendant Sonotone until directed to do so by the trial court.
Defendant Sonotone then pleaded the agreement in a supplemental answer.
[3] The rule in this state, applied in many cases, is that
a release of one joint tort feasor is a release of all (Bee v.
Cooper, 217 Cal. 96 [17 P.2d 740]; Bogardus v. O'Dea, 105
Cal.App. 189 [287 P. 149]; see, also, cases cited in 20 McK.
Dig., p. 615), but that a mere covenant not to sue one joint
tort feasor does not release the others. (Lewis v. Jf)hnson, 12
Cal.2d 558,562 [86 P.2d 99]; Kincheloe v. Retail Credit Co.,
Inc., 4 Cal.2d 21 [46 P.2d 971].) There is authority in other

)
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jurisdictions for a contrary holding, where the one maJ?ng
the release reserves his rights against the others, if he has not
received full satisfaction. (See, Rest., Tol.'flS § 885.) This
view is illustrated by McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659, which
proceeds on the theory that it is a question of fact and intent
whether a settlement is made in full satisfaction or merely
as the best obtainable compromise; and that a partial satisfaction taken in compromise does not discharge the other
wrongdoers. It should be noted, however, that the McKenna
ease also recognizes the right to contribution among joint tort
feasors, which is not permitted in this state.
[4] As pointed out in the McKenna case, the distinction
between a release and a covenant not to sue is entirely arti1leial. .As between the parties to the agreement, the final result is the same in both eases, namely, that there is no further
recovery from the defendant who makes the settlement, and
the di1rerence in the effect as to third parties is based mainly.
if Dot entirely, on the fact that in one case there is a.n immediate release, whereas in the other there L'I merely an agreement DOt to prosecute a suit. The rule regarding a covenant
not to sue was apparently adopted as an exception to the strict
release rule because the courts desired to modify the latter
rule by indirection.
'
'[5] There does not seem to be any prior decision involving
an agreement exactly like that made by the 'plaintiff herein.
(C/. Schramm v. Brooklyn Heights B.Co., 35 App.Div. 334
N.Y.s. 945].) On its face the agreement is not strictly
& Nlease or a covenant not to sue, although it partakes somewhat of the nature of both.
[6] A release has beer. defined as the abandonment; relinquishment or giving up of a right or claim to the person
against whom it might have been demanded or enforced
(Black's Law Dict., Ballentine's Law Diet.) and its effect is
to extinguish the cause of actionj hence it maybe pleaded as
a defense to the action. ['1] A covenant not to sue, on the
other hand, is nota present abandonment or relinquishment
of the right or claim, but merely an agreement not to enforce
an existing cause of action. It does not have the effect of extinguishing the cause of action; and while, in the ease of a
sole tort feasor, the covenant may be pleaded as a bar to the
action in order to avoid circuity of action, a covenant not to
sue one of several joint tort feasors may not be so pleaded by
the covenantee, who must seek his remedy in an action for

r51
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breach of the covenant. (Sunset Scavenger Corp. v. Oddou,
11 Cal.App.2d 92, 96 [53 P.2d 188]; Hawber v. Raley, 92 Cal.
App. 701, 704 [268 P. 943); Matthey v. Gally, 4 Cal. 62, 64
[60 Am.Dec. 595].) [8] In the present case, plaintiff covenanted that, if judgment was entered against defendant Compo
ton, he would not levy execution against Compton's property
or make any demand upon him to pay the judgment or any
portion thereof. Defendant Compton, on the other hand.
covenanted that he would defend the action and would not
file the agreement "except in the event any proceedings are
commenced by Charles A. Pellett contrary to and in viola- I'
tion of this covenant." Since no execution could issue or de·
.
mand for payment of the judgment be mad~ until after entry
of the judgment, the agreement, according to its terms, could
not be pleaded as a defense to the action, and hence it lacks
one of the essential elements of a release.
The theory on which a release is held to bar a recovery is
that the plaintiff has accepted payment in satisfaction or in
compromIse of his right of action, and has released and abandoned his right of action in consideration of the payment received. In the present case there is nothing in the agreement,
or in the record, to indicate that the payments of $5 within
60 days and $10 in the event judgment was entered in favor
of plaintiff were ever made or that they were intended to or
did constitute any payment in satisfaction, in whole or in
part, or in compromise, of the right of action. There is no
provision of the agreement indicating any release or relinquishment of the right of action. and the agreement cannot
be construed as a release.
[9] In the case of covenants not to sue, while it is customary for· the covenantor to make an express agreement to
indemnify the covenantee and hold him harmless in case of
any violation of the covenants, it is not essential that there
be an express agreement to that effect, and the covenantee
may waive the express undertaking to indemnify and rely
solely upon his remedy of damages for breach of the covenant.
Hence, in the present case, the absence of any provision for
indemnification does not compel a holding that the docUment is a release.
,
[101 . On the other hand, the agreement does not purport '
to be, nor can it be construed strictly to be, a covenant not to •
sue, since it does not contemplate a cessation of the extorting.
litigation, but on the contrary provides for continuation of ..
I

I
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the trial and piaceis on defendant Compton the burden of defending the aetion until the rendition of a verdiet or a nonsuit. However, sinee the plaintiff did not expressly or by
necessary implication abandon or relinquish his elaim or right
of aetion, or agree to aeeept the payments in satisfaetion of
his' claims, and sinee the agreement according to its terms
could not be pleaded by the covenantee as a defense to the.
action, .and sinee the only agreement by plaintiff was that he
\vouldnot levy exeeution on any property of the covenantee
or make demand upon him for payment of the judgment or
any portion thereof, we are of the opinion that it is closely
akin to a covenant not to sue, that its legal effect should ~
held to be similar, and that it is not such an instrument as
will operate to release other joint tort feasors.
We do not, however, approve the provisions of the agreement which required Compton to defend the suit and bound
him "not to file this covenant and agreement in the above
entitled action, except in the event any proceedings are commenced by Charles A. Pellett contrary to and in violation of
this covenant." While the trial court did not find, and we
cannot hold as a matter of law, that there was any fraud or
collusion in this case, such an agreement might lead to a fraud
upon the court by. concealing the position of a' party who is
an important witness in the action. In the present case, however, the court and the other parties were fully informed of
the nature and contents of the agreement prior to the second
trial, and the court or jury could weigh the testimony of defendant Compton in the light of the knowledge that, since the
agreement provided that a judgment could not be enforced
against him, he was not a witness who was adverse to 'the
plaintiff. Moreover; the validity of the agreement, as between
the parties thereto, is not at· issue herein.
The judgment is reversed.

I'

'

Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
TRAYNO~ J.-I dissent. This proceeding involves separate causes of action against several defendants. (Code Civ.
Proc., §§ 379 a-ej see Kraft v. Smith, 24 Cal.2d 124, 128 [148
P.2d 23]; Peters v. Bigelow, 137 Cal.App. 135, 141 [30 P.2d
450]; Prosser, Torts, p. 1101.) Plaintiff contends that Compton caused the injury by negligently failing to remove plaster
'and cotton from plaintiff's ear, and that since he acted as

)

/
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Sonotonc's agent, Sonotone, as well as Compton, is liable for
Compton's negligence. Plaintiff also contends that Brown
and Sonotone are independently liable for his injury, even
if Compton is not, on the grounds that Brown failed to supervise Compton properly nnd advised plaintiff that the pain
in his ear was to be expected and was of no consequence, and
that Sonotone gave improper instructions to its agents.
In my opinion, plaintiff's agreement with Compton covered
only the cause of action based on Compton's own negligence
and did not relate io plaintiff's causes of action based on the
independent acts of negligence of the other defendants. (See
Ash v. Mortensen. 24 Cal.2d 654. 658-659 [150 P.2d 876];
Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liabl1ity, 25 Cal.L.Rev. 413,
423-425,442-443; Prosser, Torts, p. 1107-1111.) Plaintiff may
therefore pursue any cause of action involved in this action
consistent with lack of negligence on the part of Compton.
As to the cause of action based on Sonotone's liability for
Compton's negligent conduct as Sonotone's agent, I believe
that plaintiff is bound by his agreement with Compton that
the latter was not at fault. He cannot claim that the agreemen is fictitious in order to pursue a cause of action against
Sontone based on Compton's culpable conduct as Sonotone's
agent.
It is not necessary to determine in this case whetp.er a principal who is secondarily liable for negligent conduct of his
agent is released from liability if the plaintiff makes a compromise with the agent wherein the plaintiff for partial satisfaction of his claim for damages releases the agent. When the
secondarily liable defendant is a surety, a release of the principal debtor ordinarily discharges the debt for which the
surety is secondarily liable and releases the surety. (Lamb v.
Wahlenmaier, 144 Cal. 91, 95 [77 P. 765, 103 Am.St.Rep. 66];
see Holden v. Mensinger, 175 Cal. 300, 304 [165 p. 950] ; 4:
Williston, Contracts (rev. ed.) § 1220.) It is also settled that
a verdict in favor of an agent in a tort action terminates the
liability of the principal; since that liability is based on the
agents alleged fault and is incompatible with a verdict denying blameworthy conduct on the part of the agent. (Bradley
v. Rosenthal, 154 Cal. 420. 423 [97 P. 875, 129 Am.St.Rep.
171]; Pimple v. Southern Pacific 00., 38 Cal.App. 727, 731
[177 P. 871]; see 78 A.L.R. 365; 1 Cal..1ur. 845.) The agree- i
ment in the present case was not a compromise and did not ;
give plaintiff partial or full satisfaction for his damages. In

)
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my opinion the five dollars to be paid by Compton upon the
execution of the agreement was only a nominal consideration
for plaintiff's promise "that in the event a judgment is entel'ed against said G. L. Compton ... he will not levy execution upon said judgment against any property of said G. L.
Compton and . . . will make no demand upon G. L. Compton
to pay said judgment or any part thereof."
The real significance of the agreement, which was to be
concea1ed from Sonotone and the court, appears from the circumstances under which it was made. Those circumstances
speak for themselves. Any person who introduceS foreign substances into the body of another must exercise care in removing them (see Ales v. Ryan,S Cal.2d 82, 106 [64 P.2d
409}; Engelking v. Carlson, 13 Ca1.2d 216, 221 {SS P.2d
695]; Armstrong v. Wallace, S Ca1.App.2d 429, 439 [47 P.2d
740J.) Plaintiff could therefore assume that he had a promising case with respect to the cause of action based on Compton's negligence and could expect to recover from Sonotone
the damages caused by the negligence of its agent Compton.
It is apparent that plaintiff· was interested in maintaining the
outward appearance of a lawsuit against Compton in order
to get Compton's testimony as a presumably hostile witness
to prove Compton's negligence and to make Sonotone responsible for that negligence. Hence the agreement that in substance provided that Compton's testimony would not make
him responsible to plaintiff. This scheme made the action
against Compton a collusive proceeding. It is clear that
plaintiff expected by this agreement to secure favorable testimony from Compton in his action against Sonotone, and that
Compton's true performance was to be the giving of favorable
testimony. Since the contract cou1d not set forth 8Uch an
immoral consideration it was predicated on the agreement
that Compton was not guilty of culpable conduct. It provided: "WHEREAS, Charles S. Pellett, through his attorney,
has become satisfied that the defendant, G. L. Compton, in
the performance of any acts or his negligent failure to do
anything which should have been done, was 8Ubject to the
'direction and control and 8Upervision of John E. Brown and
the Sonotone Corporation. and that any negligence on the part
of said Dr. G. L. Compton, WQ,S not due to any cu?pability of
,aid G. L. Compton." (Italics added.)
Plaintiff should be bound by his agreement that there was
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no culpability on Compton's part. He should not be allowed
to maintain that this agreement waR fictitious after contriving
to obtain Compton's favorable testimony by promising him
immunity from liability. (See Civ. Code, § 3517.) He cannot agree that Compton is blameless and at the same time
make Compton's principaJ .liable on the basiR of culpable conduct of Compton. Fraud would be encouraged if it were held
that such an agreement has no effect on the principal's liability, which depends solely on the fault of the agent. The
public policy underlying the liability of the principal for the
agent's torts (Otis Elevator Co. v. First National Bank, 163
Cal. 31, 39 [124 P. 704, 41 L.R.A.N.S. 529]; Bank of Ca,lilornia. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 52 Cal. 280, 288; see
Prosser, Torts, p. 472) has no effect when the plaintiff and the
agent conspire to make the principal alone responsible for the
agent's fault..

Edmonds, J., concurred.

)
,-)

